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Executive Summary 
  
Mali is one of the world’s 19 most 
fragile countries.1 Its severe fragility is 
exacerbated by an ongoing conflict in the 
country’s north. We assess the country’s key 
drivers of fragility and develop policies to 
begin addressing the conflict and support the 
move out of fragility.  
 
Overview: The sub-Saharan country of Mali 
is being battered by an ongoing and 
degenerating conflict following an uprising 
in the north of the country in 2011. Mali ranks 
as fragile, with poor scores in authority, 
legitimacy and capacity.2 Fragility has been 
linked to political instability and violence, 
instability of contracts, and corruption. 
Moreover, these factors cause donors to cut 
back aid,3 as the donor community did in 
2012 following a military coup in 2012.4 This 
leads to a fragility trap, in which the country 
is unable to exit a state of fragility due to the 
continued presence of these factors that in 
turn affect the amount of aid.5 In the case of 
Mali, the main drivers of fragility are ethnic 
and political violence, poor governance and 
human rights abuses, and unequal and poor 
development.  
 
 
Figure 1 - Regional Map of Mali6 
 
 There have been three major Tuareg 
uprisings since the country won 
independence in 1960. In 1962, the Tuareg 
revolted in an effort to establish an 
independent zone. Perceptions of an unfair 
distribution of state benefits and 
development, compounded by the fact that 
the majority of the regime was drawn from 
ethnic groups to the south, prompted the 
rebellion.7 Another uprising in 1991 was 
linked to exclusion from political power.8 In 
2012, there was another rebellion over 
persistent perceptions of exclusion and a 
failure to implement better political 
representation, and which has involved 
Islamist armed groups such as Ansar Dine 
and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM).9 The latest rebellion has been fueled 
by the use of weapons from Libya, brought 
by Tuareg mercenaries after the fall of the 
Libyan regime.10  
 
 
Figure 2 – Map of West African States11 
 
Violence has been continual and 
involves a number of actors, including the 
Malian government, foreign military forces 
such as France and UN peacekeepers, Tuareg 
militia groups, and Islamist insurgents. In 
2012, the Malian military overthrew the 
democratically elected leader of Mali, and 
lost the north as a result. The coup was 
motivated by a perceived mishandling of the 
Tuareg rebellion. Soldiers were sent into 
battle without adequate weapons and 
ammunition. This led to discontent and 
unrest. Further governmental incompetence 
resulted in mutiny.12 A French-led military 
intervention in 2013 pushed the coalition of 
Tuareg and Islamist insurgents back, but the 
Malian state still has no meaningful presence 
in the north. The conflict, as well as serious 
deficiencies in governance and development 
which are also exacerbated by the fighting, 
have affected the state’s authority, capacity, 
and legitimacy.  
 Malian security forces have not been 
particularly effective at restoring control in 
the north. Besides enacting a coup, they have 
also recently been involved in repressing 
protest, sometimes violently. Protestors have 
been fired upon and killed.13 Contributing to 
the conflict are ongoing ties between the 
government and the anti-separatist Tuareg 
militia GATIA, which have undermined the 
peace process by calling into question the 
commitment of the government to peace.14  
 While the government, in partnership 
with the UN, has made efforts to reconcile the 
warring factions, the peace accords have met 
with little success. A National Conference of 
Understanding has been called for December, 
but the groups who are to participate in it 
have yet to meet with Mahamat Saleh 
Annadif, the Secretary-General’s Special 
Representative, responsible for mediation.15 
Given the ongoing fighting between GATIA 
and the pro-independence coalition, the 
Coordination of Movements for Azawad 
(CMA), the peace accords signed in June 
2015 have held little credibility.16  
 The greatest problem faced by the 
government and by partners is the 
government’s inability to exercise authority 
over its territory, deliver services to 
underdeveloped regions to reduce the 
horizontal inequalities that have fueled the 
conflict, and govern effectively. Government 
officials have been unable to carry out their 
duties due to unrest and violence,17 and 
elections scheduled for November have been 
pushed back again because of the conflict, 
damaging the legitimacy and credibility of 
the state.18 Corruption and human rights 
abuses are endemic to government and 
security forces.19 
 
End User 
 
The end-user for this policy brief is 
the Government of Canada, in particular 
Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and the 
Department of National Defence (DND). 
Canada’s official development aid to Mali in 
2014-2015 was 152 million dollars, primarily 
targeting poverty and inequality, especially 
among women and youth, and delivery of 
basic services for food security, health and 
nutrition, and improvements in governance.20 
Given the dynamic conditions and evolving 
security situation in Mali, GAC should use 
our analysis to adjust its priorities and 
identify areas of concern. The expected 
outcome for stakeholders is a sustainable 
reduction in violence with a credible 
commitment to the peace process, legitimate 
and effective governance over all the territory 
of Mali, and improved economic 
opportunities that reduce support for armed 
groups. 
 
External and Internal Stakeholders 
 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keita is the 
president and former prime minister of Mali, 
elected in 2013. He has made his priority the 
reunification and reconciliation of the state of 
Mali.21 He has demonstrated a willingness to 
work with external actors, including Western 
donors and military partners. However, he 
has faced accusations of corruption, both 
from political rivals22 and from the 
international donor community.23 Moreover, 
he has been accused of maintaining links with 
GATIA, a pro-government Tuareg militia. 
His party has suffered recent defections over 
poor governance and a failure to resolve the 
conflict.24 He is opposed by Soumalia Cisse, 
an opposition leader in Bamako, who wants 
to lower the cost of entering elections and 
remove corruption from government.25 
 Abdoulaye Idrissa Maiga was 
appointed Minister of Defense early in 
September, 2016, following the capture of a 
central Malian town by suspected Islamist 
gunmen.26 Though he has made it a priority 
to improve the effectiveness of the Malian 
military and security forces by procuring 
more equipment and training troops, the 
Malian security forces continue to face 
difficulty in financing supporting operations. 
Furthermore, the Malian government has not 
enjoyed much success in building 
partnerships in the north with former rebel 
groups and militias.27  
 Angela Merkel is the Chancellor of 
Germany. She has committed 550 German 
soldiers to the UN peacekeeping force, and 
has offered support to implementing the 
peace accord. Germany is also contributing to 
the training mission in Mali, which is 
involved in training Malian security forces. 
On a visit in October, she liaised with Keita 
to promote the implementation of the peace 
accord. Germany prioritizes the stability and 
security of Mali, among other states in the 
Sahel region, in order to curb migration from 
North Africa into Europe.28 Recently, 
Germany approved a hike in development aid 
to UNHCR, raising their contribution to the 
organization’s activities in Africa to 298 
million Euros.29 
 The CMA is a collection of pro-
independence armed groups. They want to 
establish an independent state in the north 
called Azawad. In 2015, they signed on to a 
peace agreement with the government and 
GATIA. However, fighting between pro-
independence and pro-government forces, 
particularly around the northern town of 
Kidal, has demonstrated that little progress 
has been made in implementing the terms of 
the agreement.30 Moreover, there is evidence 
that the CMA may have maintained ties with 
Islamist groups.31 
 The Groupe Autodéfense Touareg 
Imghad et Alliés (GATIA) is a pro-
government militia formed in 2014 to counter 
violence from pro-independence groups. 
They are led by General El Hadj Ag Gamou, 
who formerly fought for Libya.32 They armed 
themselves partly in order to obtain a place in 
the peace negotiations.33 They are opposed 
by the CMA, and have ties to the Malian 
government.34 Though GATIA signed the 
peace agreement,35 there is ongoing fighting 
between them and the CMA, and in October 
they blockaded the town of Kidal and refused 
to allow food or other  goods through unless 
they were able to distribute them. Most of the 
Tuareg in GATIA are from the Imghad clan, 
historically subservient to the CMA-affiliated 
Ifoghas clan, and ethnic resentment also 
contributes to the conflict between the two 
groups.36 Gamou claims that one of the 
primary causes of conflict between GATIA 
and the CMA is the fact that the mayor of 
Kidal is of the Ifoghas clan.37  
French troops have been deployed in 
Mali since early 2013 under operation 
Serval.38  Since that time, Operation Serval 
has been succeeded by Operation Barkhane. 
Operation Barkhane is an anti-terrorism 
Operation being undertaken in Burkina Faso, 
Chad, Mali, Mauritania and Niger. The 
French forces in the Region are 3000 strong 
and are tasked with what French President 
Francois Hollande has said as, “prevent… the 
highway of all forms of traffics to become a 
place of permanent passage, where jihadist 
groups between Libya and the Atlantic Ocean 
can rebuild themselves."39 The French 
operation has been criticised as not 
contributing to peace and security in 
Northern Mali by ignoring the conflict 
between the Malian State and Northern rebel 
groups, as well as between the rebel groups 
themselves.40 
The United Nations 
Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization 
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was 
established in Mali pursuant to United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 2100 on 
April 25, 2013.41 Since April 2013 
MINUSMA consists of 13,083 personnel, 
with 11,883 being uniformed personnel and 
1,246 civilian personnel.42 The current 
approved budget for 2016-2017 is USD $ 
$933,411,000.43 The MINUSMA mandate is 
to “support political processes in that country 
and carry out a number of security-related 
tasks.”44 This was qualified in 2015 to 
include: monitoring the ceasefire agreement, 
supporting the implementation of the peace 
agreement, protection of civilians and human 
rights, performing humanitarian assistance, 
and undertaking cultural preservation.45 A 
2015 survey done in the Northern provinces 
of Mali have found that the population in 
those areas does not trust that MINUSMA 
can provide security in the conflict regions or 
positively affect change.46 
 Affected stakeholders also include the 
Malian people, including the Tuareg and 
other northern peoples affected by state 
fragility and conflict.  
 
Key Issues 
 
 The Country Indicators for Foreign 
Policy (CIFP) rank authority, legitimacy and 
capacity (ALC) for states. Authority refers to 
a states ability to control people and territory. 
Legitimacy measures the extent to which the 
population of a state views the government as 
truly representative of them, accountable and 
responsive to their needs. Capacity describes 
the ability of the state to deliver services to 
the population. Together, poor performance 
in these areas indicates a fragile state.47 CIFP 
is an initiative undertaken by students and 
faculty at Carleton University that has three 
main objectives. Firstly, CIFP develops tools 
for fragile state evaluation and assessment. 
Second, CIFP evaluates individual country 
performance. CIFP also engages in research 
regarding the link between “state fragility and 
selected key variables.”48 CIFP ranks the 
severity of key variables on a 9 point system, 
9 indicating the poorest possible 
performance.49 
 We rank ALC and structural clusters 
from 1 (most important for fragility) up. 
Intensity is ranked Low/Medium/High. 
Trend is ranked Negative (degrading 
conditions)/Stable (no improvement and no 
degradation of conditions)/Volatile(unstable 
improvement and degradation of 
conditions)/Positive (improvement of 
conditions). We used the most recently 
available rankings for ALC.  
 
Authority: 2015 CIFP Rating50 - 6.72 
Rank: 1 
Intensity: High 
Trend: Negative 
The Malian government’s level of 
authority since the 2012 coup and 
subsequently has been low, and is currently 
deteriorating. The state does not have a 
monopoly of force over the entire territory. 
Attacks against French and other foreign 
peacekeepers have been ongoing.51 Attacks 
against troops and camps in Niger have also 
occurred from Mali,52 indicating a poor 
ability to monitor and secure borders. The 
state is responsible for service delivery as 
part of its level of authority, but has little 
presence in the north and is therefore unable 
to provide many basic services.  
 
Legitimacy: 2012 CIFP Rating53 -6.32  
 Rank: 2 
 Intensity: High 
 Trend: Volatile 
Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta was 
democratically elected in 2013 as the 
president of Mali, and so represents a 
legitimate government. This government, 
although legitimate for the State, has no 
presence in the conflict regions of the north. 
These regions are instead governed by local 
armed groups, who have no legitimacy 
except that a 2015 survey shows that 
population in select regions look to these 
local armed groups for governance and 
security.54 Perceived and actual corruption of 
elites has also deeply affected the 
government’s legitimacy.55 
 
Capacity: 2014 CIFP Rating56 - 7.54 
Rank: 2 
Intensity: High 
Trend: Negative 
Foreign aid and initiatives by foreign 
governments have recently increased the 
Malian government's capacity. Due to the 
insecurity in the north, the government has 
not been able to use its new capacity for those 
whose lack of goods and services from the 
conflict itself. The appointed governors of 
Kidal, Menaka and Taoudenni have been 
unable to attend their duty stations due to the 
levels of violent instability, and the number 
of prefects is at 53%.57 This is an obvious 
demonstration that the Malian government 
has little ability to govern in the north. Due to 
chronic violence, the state has been unable to 
deliver development aid to the northern 
regions. The Malian military lacks the 
capacity to independently defend its own 
territories, and relies on foreign intervention. 
 
Cluster Analysis 
 
Security 
Rank: 1 
Intensity: High 
Trend: Negative 
 Mali’s security since the 2012 coup 
has been weak. World Bank indicators for the 
absence of political instability, violence and 
terrorism deteriorated from 2013-2014.58  
 
 
Figure 2 – Estimate of perceptions of political stability 
and the absence of violence and terrorism. 
 
While expenditures on the security 
sector have risen since 2014 to 2.4% of the 
GDP, and battle-related deaths have fallen 
overall since 2013,59 the state remains absent 
from the north.  
 
 
Figure 3 – Battle-related deaths per year in Mali.  
 
The number of attacks against 
peacekeepers, as well as fighting between the 
opposed Tuareg militias GATIA and the 
CMA, has risen, and in the center of the 
country the security situation has also 
worsened. This indicates that the conflict in 
the north is actually spreading south.60 There 
is also evidence that the conflict has moved 
beyond the borders of Mali, and there are now 
attacks against soldiers and refugee camps in 
Niger that appear to have their origin in 
Mali.61 
Despite the signing of a peace deal in 
June 2015, little progress has been made in its 
implementation. The conflict has also 
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prevented effective governance of the north, 
with interim authorities unable to go to their 
cities because of the violence.62 Tens of 
millions of dollars of developmental aid have 
also been put on hold until the conflict de-
escalates, contributing to the fragility trap.63  
Besides the fighting between rival 
secular militias, Islamist groups such as 
Ansar Dine and AQIM have continued to 
attack soldiers and civilians. The Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data Project 
(ACLED) reports several attacks in the 
month of November against Malian soldiers 
and UN peacekeepers.64 These attacks 
continue to increase in frequency and 
sophistication, posing a threat to 
peacekeeping forces, preventing the effective 
administration of governance and 
developmental aid, and contributing  to a 
more unstable environment.65  
Security forces are also involved in 
human rights abuses, including arbitrary 
detention, torture, and killings.66 Protests 
against the government in Gao were put 
down violently by security forces.67 In 
August, protestors were shot while calling for 
the release of Ras Bath, an activist and critic 
of the government and military.68 ACLED 
also reports that GATIA, allied to 
government forces in the north, has continued 
to fight,69 as well as executions of rival 
tribespeople.70  
Overall, the deteriorating and serious 
nature of the security crisis, as well as its 
effects on the delivery of services to the 
territory of the state, indicates that resolving 
the security situation is of primary 
importance in our policy plan. Effective 
governance and development in the north 
cannot proceed without stabilization.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Governance 
Rank:2 
Intensity: High 
Trend: Negative 
 Governance since the 2012 coup has 
been poor. Prior to the coup, Mali had been 
considered a model state for democracy, 
although governance had been relatively 
concentrated in one ethnic group, the 
Mande.71 Using a structural analysis, we note 
that between 2011-2012, the CPIA rating for 
transparency, accountability and corruption 
fell to 3.72 Voice and accountability shows 
consistent downwards trends.73 The control 
of corruption has remained unstable; 
although there have been some recent 
improvements, it is difficult to tell whether or 
not these will be permanent.74  
 
 
Figure 4– Control of corruption percentile rank.  
 
Political stability and the absence of 
violence and terrorism also fell in 2012 and 
have shown little improvement.75 Structural 
analysis furthermore indicates that overall 
perceptions of government effectiveness, 
while showing some recent improvement, 
have been on a general decline.76 This trend 
indicates a negative development for 
governance.  
Perceived corruption has greatly 
increased77 and has led to led to general 
population apathy, and the upcoming election 
have been met with little enthusiasm.78 This 
indicates a low level of legitimacy for the 
Malian government, which has also faced 
opposition from civil society over proposed 
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election laws that raised the cost of becoming 
a candidate by USD $43,000, two-and-a-half 
times higher than the previous sum.79 This 
decision was widely contested by opposition 
leaders such as Soumalia Cisse .80 The 
elections taking place in late November have 
been delayed for two years, owing to the 
instability in the north, which has also been 
blamed for affecting the election campaign 
and impeding the democratic process.81 
Interim authorities have been 
appointed but are not in place, indicating poor 
control over territory and continued volatility 
in the security situation. Moreover, promises 
made in the 2015 peace accords to make local 
authorities an elected position have not been 
followed through.82 These interim authorities 
are appointed, leading to violent protests in 
the northern city of Gao that resulted in 
deaths.83 
Resolving the security situation in 
Mali is of paramount importance to allow 
effective governance and the delivery of aid 
and development assistance, to ensure 
sustainable stability. The poor quality and 
lack of robustness of institutions in fragile 
states has been demonstrated to be a driver of 
state fragility.84 We must put into place 
policies which contribute to greater 
government effectiveness and accountability 
mechanisms that reduce the risk of 
corruption, thereby augmenting the 
government’s ability to exercise authority 
over its territory and improve its legitimacy.  
 
Human Development 
Rank: 3 
Intensity: High 
Trend: Negative 
 Development has been greatly 
impeded by the conflict. Although schools 
have reopened in the north, teachers have not 
been able to attend them due to the 
instability.85 Continued instability and 
violence, if sustained, will have deleterious 
effects on the education and development 
prospects for the entire region. Instability is 
also responsible for the withholding of 
millions of dollars in aid.  
While there has been some 
improvement in certain economic indicators, 
such as GDP and GDP per capita,86growth 
has been unstable, and is largely subject to 
fluctuations in conflict and stability. 
Inequality has also proved to be unstable, 
with the latest trend showing a slight increase 
in inequality as measured by the GINI 
coefficient.87 
 
 
Figure 5– GDP growth per capita in Mali.  
 
Currently, Mali uses 59.4 kilowatt 
hours per capita, indicating serious shortfalls 
in infrastructure development.88 A lack of 
modern energy infrastructure affects 
economic development and job creation, and 
limits the diversification of the economy.89 
According to 2012 World Bank Data, 50.4 
percent of Mali’s population that resides in 
urban areas has access to electricity. This is 
vastly different from Mali’s rural areas, 
where only 11.9 percent of the population has 
access to electricity. 90 This inequality of 
access and general poor levels of access 
points to inequality of development between 
rural and urban areas, highlighting the 
inequality between Northern Mali, which is 
mostly rural, and Southern Mali. Differences 
between rural and urban regions is illustrated 
in Figure 6.  
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Figure 6 – Access to Electricity by Percentage of 
Population in Urban and Rural Environments, as well 
as the Total Population. 
 
Compounding issues in unequal 
access to development resources, the conflict 
in the north has interrupted aid flows, 
prevented populations from obtaining 
income, and displaced 135 000 Malians.91 
Resentments over the unequal distribution of 
development played a role in provoking 
conflicts in the north and must be addressed 
to mitigate the risks of further instability.  
Before significant investments can be 
made in infrastructure development and 
economic growth, the security situation must 
be brought under control and governance 
over all the state’s territory be established in 
order to provide a stable environment for 
development to take place while also 
mitigating the risks of corrupt, rent-seeking 
behavior on the part of elites.  
 
 Environment 
 Rank: 5 
 Intensity: Medium 
 Trend: Stable 
  The influence of the environment on 
the quality of life in Mali has been 
deteriorating slightly since the effects of 
climate change have begun to show. 92 The 
environmental issues that Mali face are 
long-term and are not directly related to 
deficiencies that could be the focus of 
feasible, and actionable policies. For this 
reason, in terms of analytical value and 
policy direction, it is not of the same 
importance as some of the other analysis 
clusters. The main concern for the 
environment in Mali is the prevalence of 
droughts. 2015 World Bank Data shows that 
41 percent of Mali’s GDP comes from 
agricultural practices.93 Drought would 
therefore cause a decrease in employment, 
food security and economic development. 
Decreases in water availability may also 
make conflicts between agriculturalists and 
pastoralists more likely, as there is a 
decrease in available fertile land.94  
Northern Mali has been influenced 
negatively by climate change. Tessalit, a 
region in Northern Mail shows a decrease in 
average annual precipitation of 26 percent 
from the periods 1951-70 compared with 
1971-2000.95 A decrease in water would 
also affect Mali’s energy infrastructure, as 
80 of Mali's electricity is generated from 
hydro-power.96 Decreases in rainfall 
decrease the energy output by hydroelectric 
facilities.97 
 
Economic Development 
Rank: 4 
Intensity: High 
Trend: Volatile 
 Following the 2012 crisis, security 
and political instability generated ample 
domestic output fluctuations, in particular a 
sharp drop in GDP growth as a result of 
infrastructure destruction, population 
outflows, suspension of economic activities, 
and a collapse in aid and tourism.98 Figure 4 
illustrates this instability. Mali’s economy is 
projected to grow by around 5% annually 
over the next three years, reflecting a return 
to normalcy and a gradual tapering of the 
recent surge in international aid.99 
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Figure 7 – Annual Percentage of GDP Growth in Mali 
 
Mali’s favourable economic outlook 
is subject to substantial and persistent 
downside risks, among which the most 
critical are the collapse of the peace 
agreement and the resurgence of insecurity 
throughout the country, recurrence of lapses 
in governance, climatic shocks, and any 
further decline in global gold or cotton prices, 
the major two export products of Mali.100 
 
Demography and Population 
Rank: 5 
Intensity: Medium  
Trend: Negative 
The demography of Mali could 
present a problem to the security situation in 
Mali within the next few years. 2015 World 
Bank Data shows that population under 14 
has risen to 47.5% of the total population.101 
Youth bulges have been connected to security 
risks before, reflecting the fact that large 
amounts of youth with high rates of 
unemployment mean that they are more 
likely to engage in rebelling as a way to 
generate income.102 
Mali has also been experiencing 
increasing urbanisation, which can put strains 
on public services.103 While the percentage 
rate per year of urbanisation in Mali has 
fallen to 4.9 in 2015 from its highest at 5.7 in 
2006-2007,104 the urban population increased 
to 39.9 % of the total population. Moreover, 
while the percentage of the urban population 
living in slums has decreased since 1990 
(94.2%), it is still very high at 56.3%, with a 
majority of the urban population living in 
slum conditions.105 
 
 
Figure 8 – Left Map showing ethno-linguistic 
divisions, Right Map showing population density106 
 
Scenarios 
 
Best case: In December the National 
Conference of Understanding will be taking 
place in an effort to finally implement the 
peace agreement, which has hitherto enjoyed 
little success. In the best-case scenario, 
GATIA and the CMA both attend the NCU 
with Ibrahim Keita. Keita makes a credible 
commitment to integrate the former rebel 
groups, as well as GATIA, into a northern 
security force. He also makes the interim 
authorities for the north elected positions, 
instead of unelected officials that have caused 
civil unrest and violence in Gao, and ensures 
greater northern representation in the 
political process, thereby following through 
on the terms of the peace accord. 
 Keita is able to move the Malian 
military into the north and provide security, 
stability and rule of law, capitalizing on help 
from France and Germany, while also 
integrating former rebel units into a northern 
security force that works in cooperation with 
the government. This will reduce the threat of 
Islamist groups while increasing legitimacy 
and authority by enhancing government 
credibility. By May 2017, the security 
situation will stabilize enough to allow 
Malian farmers in the north to work without 
substantial interference. Stability in the north 
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will also enhance the ability of the 
government to efficiently deliver substantial 
international development aid to the 
underdeveloped regions in northern Mali, 
such as meals for children in almost 1000 
northern schools that have been closed due to 
instability and violence. Finally, in four 
months, facing serious opposition in Bamako 
from citizens and opposition leaders, Keita 
repeals a controversial electoral reform bill 
that significantly raised the cost of entering 
elections, ensuring a more open democratic 
process and greater political representation 
overall.  
 Significant benchmarks, such as 
energy and natural resource exploitation 
infrastructure, are begun. Unemployment 
rates begin to fall as jobs become available.  
 
Worst case: The CMA and GATIA 
fail to come to an agreement and do not attend 
the NCU. Despite the urging of the US, Keita 
continues his support for GATIA, fuelling 
violence in the north. After one year there is 
no improvement in the security situation, and 
the CMA declares that it will not negotiate 
with the Malian government, citing broken 
promises and a lack of progress in 
implementing the terms of the peace process. 
The US reduces the aid package of 1 billion 
dollars and will not help the Malian military, 
as their urgings to Keita to cut support and 
ties to GATIA went unheeded.  
Over the next six months, ongoing 
demonstrations in Bamako over corruption 
and the new electoral law are met with 
violence, and security forces fire on 
protestors. During this violence, and 
demonstrations in Timbuktu and Gao in 
solidarity, political opponents and opposition 
leaders are detained. A military commander 
initiates a coup, claiming to be doing so in 
order to restore democracy and hold free 
elections, but the international community, 
including Germany under Angela Merkel, 
withdraws development aid and civil and 
military cooperation. The result is military 
collapse in the north. Ansar Dine and AQIM 
make significant gains in the north by the end 
of the year. Due to the threat of violence, no 
progress is made on improving infrastructure 
and development. 
 
Policy Responses 
 
Security: The desired outcomes are 
increased state authority over its territory, a 
state monopolization of violence, an end to 
human rights abuses by security forces, and a 
decrease in violent incidents. Success is 
indicated by a sustained decrease over one 
year of violent incidents, a sustained Malian 
troop presence in northern territory over one 
year, and an end to protestor deaths by 
security forces within one year. Impact 
assessments will be conducted every month 
to monitor compliance with training 
objectives that prioritize respect for human 
rights, with continued training and funding 
conditional on meeting the above 
benchmarks.  
 Our entry points are engagement with 
Defense Minister Maiga and the European 
Union training mission (EUTM) in Mali. In 
conjunction with the EUTM, we propose 
sending a force of 200 Canadian soldiers and 
officers to train with the Malian military. We 
expect this would cost 16 million dollars per 
year,107 and will be able to train 
approximately 2000 soldiers.108 The EUTM 
has focused on increasing the operational 
capacity of the Malian armed forces while 
also mentoring senior leadership in 
subordination to legitimate civilian authority. 
The have a budget of 33.4 million Euros and 
involve roughly 500 soldiers.109 Our 
contribution, especially given our experience 
training foreign militaries in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and the Ukraine, will be a substantial 
capacity-boost to the EUTM. We should also 
contribute 1 million dollars for non-lethal 
equipment procurement, such as mine 
detectors and radios, to enhance the ability of 
the Malian army to operate while reducing 
casualties.  
This policy should increase the 
effectiveness of the Malian army at the 
tactical level, allowing them to operate 
effectively in the north, while also ensuring 
that the senior leadership does not carry out 
another coup. 
The risks associated with this policy 
include threats to Canadian soldiers, the risk 
of enabling a second coup with the training 
provided, and the risk of a military with more 
power to inflict human rights abuses. The risk 
to Canadian soldiers can be mitigated by 
conducting training primarily in areas away 
from conflict-affected regions. Extensive 
monitoring and mentorship, with training and 
equipment funding conditional on 
compliance with respect for human rights and 
civil authority, should mitigate the risks of a 
coup or human rights abuses.  
 
Governance: The goal for the policy 
proposed is to increase governmental 
legitimacy and authority. This can be done by 
increasing the Malian government’s ability to 
exercise governance over the ungoverned 
areas within the Malian regions of Gao, Kidal 
and Tombouctou. Success for this policy 
should be measured through the 
emplacement of interim authorities in those 
regions of Mali within the next year, the 
ability to hold democratic elections for those 
positions the following year. This will 
depend on the effectiveness of the policy up 
to that point and the security situation in Mali 
at that time. 
In order to place interim authorities in 
the unstable regions of Mali, first our security 
goals previously mentioned must be 
achieved. This is evidenced by the fact that 
currently in order for government officials to 
even visit the unsecure regions of Mali, 
permission must be obtained from the local 
armed groups.110 We propose that Canada 
take the position of a Cash-on-Delivery aid 
donor that will contribute funds once certain 
conditions have been met. The Cash-on-
Delivery aid system is an innovative aid 
system designed by the Centre for Global 
Development, which “is a contract for 
funders and recipients to agree on a mutually 
desired outcome and a fixed payment for 
each unit of confirmed progress.”111 The 
financial aid that Canada gives through this 
method is an incentive for Mali to achieve the 
conditions proposed. Once the security 
situation has been achieved, Mali will 
introduce interim governments for currently 
ungoverned regions, and the leadership must 
be drawn from local candidates. Once this has 
been achieved and the local situation is 
stable, Canada should invest in supporting 
the local elections by monitoring, as well as 
through infrastructure development to 
facilitate the voting of individuals in harder 
to reach areas. Another policy directed at 
increasing government legitimacy that can be 
enacted through the Cash-on-Delivery 
program is the removal of corruption. Canada 
can invest in periodic assessments of levels of 
corruption, while promising funds to Mali 
once certain levels have been reached, 
thereby encouraging Mali to enact these 
changes. 
This policy should increase the 
governance of Northern Mali through its 
local capacity and legitimacy, while also 
giving the local Malian people greater 
representation in government and give 
foreign aid donors new avenues to directly 
influence Northern Mali’s deficiencies. 
Chauvet and Collier discuss the potential 
negative impacts of having elections too 
frequently or infrequently,112 and so the 
impacts of the elections brought on by this 
policy must be closely monitored and 
adjusted accordingly. Other potential risks of 
implementing this policy are the use of 
isomorphic mimicry to meet benchmark 
steps, as well as the potential for the Malian 
government not to react to tactics of 
incentive. Isomorphic mimicry is a process 
by which a newly created institution in a 
developing State mimics a successful 
institution in a developed State in form, but 
not in function. This would allow the new 
institution to appear functional in order to 
gain benefits and recognition, while not 
having any or little positive functioning 
processes. 
 
Human Development: In order to 
positively influence Mali’s human 
development, the infrastructure of the areas 
in which human development are inadequate 
must be improved. This will be done through 
the increase of Mali’s electrical infrastructure 
to its Northern regions. The benefits of access 
to electricity are well documented,113 and 
include evidence such as increasing studying 
hours, which increases education and thereby 
long term earning potential.114 The reduction 
in household air pollution also decreases the 
risk of respiratory disease, especially among 
women and children. Access to electricity 
increases household business income, and 
allows agricultural practices to become more 
efficient through the use of electric tools. The 
success of the proposed policy would be 
measured through the achievement of those 
previously mentioned factors, in the quality 
of life and economic achievement of the 
population of Mali. 
We propose that Canada invest in 
Mali through donor projects aimed at directly 
influencing individuals’ access to electricity 
in the rural areas of Northern Mali. The entry 
point for this project will be Malick 
Alhousseini, the Malian Minister for Energy 
and Water and a native Muslim from the Gao 
region of Mali. The goals of this policy will 
be accomplished by providing households 
with off-grid electricity solutions such as 
1 David Carment, Simon Langlois, and 
Bertrand Yiagadeesen Samy. "Assessing 
solar panel electricity. A similar project 
aimed at providing electricity to rural areas in 
Sub-Saharan Africa proposes a cost of US 
$36 million in order to provide 20 million 
people with access to electricity by 2030.115 
World Bank Data for 2012 shows that 
at that time, only 11.9 percent of Malians in 
rural areas had access to electricity.116 
Increasing this amount would improve the 
quality of life for the population in those 
areas. Increasing Northern Malian’s access to 
electricity would decrease the horizontal 
inequality issues that Mali faces between its 
Northern and Southern regions and 
populations. 
Possible risks in the undertaking of 
this policy include the potential for the 
appropriation of assets by armed rebel 
groups, and subsequently being used as a 
catalyst for rent seeking behaviour. For this 
reason it is important that before undertaking 
this policy, or other investments in Northern 
Mali, the security objectives outlined must be 
firmly in place. 
Another possible avenue for Canada 
to positively influence human development 
in Mali is support for the World Food 
Programme (WFP). The WFP is currently 
undertaking an initiative to provide meals at 
school for children in Mali’s Northern 
regions117, often their only meal. The World 
Food Programme has advertised that if USD 
$3 million is not funded into the program, it 
will have to suspend its activities.118 If these 
activities are suspended, parents are more 
likely to keep children at home to improve 
household income.119 Contributing to this 
project would constitute a cost effective 
method of positively affecting the 
development and wellbeing of children in 
Northern Mali. 
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